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Political Question or Judicial
Query: An Examination of the
Modern Doctrine and Its Inap-
plicability to Human Rights
Mass Tort Litigation
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States judiciary is caught in a unique quandary. In the balance
between our system of national and international justice and the respect that our
system demands the nation pay to the procedural guidelines it instills, the court
faces the grand challenge of equitably solving claims resulting from human rights
atrocities.' Yet it remains unresolved whether the court will be able to fulfill its
role and ensure such equity.2
In the wake of the explosive Holocaust litigation, the court may at long last
be told that it must stay its hands from such a noble task.3 The responsibility that
corporations have taken for these violations, resulting in settlement of claims and
damages, faces compromise by a smug affirmation that these cases do not belong
in our courts." Refusal by our judiciary to adjudicate these wrongs will affect more
1. See infra note 4 for a list of several recent and currently pending international human rights
violation cases.
2. The recently dismissed cases lwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999), and
Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248 (D.N.J. 1999), illustrate the fragile nature of class
actions brought on behalf of victims of human rights atrocities in response to violations of customary
international law. The dismissal of these two cases is the impetus for this article.
3. The Federal District Court of New Jersey dismissed both lwanowa and Burger-Fischer for want
of justiciability under the doctrine of political question. See Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 489; Burger-
Fischer, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 284-85.
4. Holocaust survivors and decedents of Holocaust victims brought claims against Swiss banks
including Union Bank of Switzerland, Credit Suisse, and Swiss Bank Corporation to recover money
deposited on the eve of the Holocaust, as well as damages from their active finance and knowing acceptance
of profits derived from looted assets and slave labor. See Amended Complaint, Weisshaus v. Union Bank
of Switz. (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 1996) (No. 96-CV-4849); Amended Complaint, Friedman v. Union Bank of
Switz., (E.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 21, 1996) (No. 96-CV-5161); Amended Complaint, World Council of
Orthodox Jewish Cmtys., Inc. v. Union Bank of Switz., (E.D.N.Y. filed July 1997) (No. 96-CV-5161);
consolidated as Telling-Grotch v. Union Bank of Switz., (E.D.N.Y) (No. 96-5161). The resulting
settlement yielded a $1.2 billion sum for the class members to divide. See Settlement Agreement at 9, 13-
14, In re Holocaust Victims Assets, (No. CV-96-4849) (E.D.N.Y., Settlement Jan. 26, 1999). The court
appointed Judah Gribetz as special master to work out the fairest plan of allocation of settlement funds. See
Letter from Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, (April 20, 1999) (on file at firm's website: www.cmht.com
(to Potential Members of the Class re: Holocaust-Related Litigation)). Other settlements are also currently
pending against French banks. See Frederic Bichon, French Banks Craft Accord on Jewish Assets,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, March 24, 1999 available in 1999 WL 2569848. The settlement agreement
than the families hurt by this scar in our world's history.' If the ability to litigate
these claims in United States courts is lost, so too is lost any true form of
enforcement of international human rights laws.6 Consequently, the powerful arm
of the Alien Tort Claim Act ("ATCA"),7 though extended, will remain unable to
cover past victims and other would-be victims.' Without remedy, law is dead:
Indeed, it is well accepted in rights theory that where there is no remedy
for a claim of right, the existence of the correlative right is tenuous at
best. The imposition of obligations within a legal framework therefore
gives rights practical authority and places interests on a higher plane of
legal prescription. In a class action human rights case, once it is
determined that international law binds the private corporate actor to
resulting from a class action brought by nearly 10,000 victims of human rights violations against Ferdinand
Marcos in the Philippines yielded $1.2 billion in exemplary and $765 million in compensatory damages.
Hilao v. Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 1996); K. Lee Boyd, Collective Rights and Corporate
Compliance: Class Adjudication of International Human Rights in U.S. Courts, 1999 B.Y.U. L. REV.
1139, 1153 n.50.
5. The Holocaust claimed the lives of over six million Jews, accounting for two-thirds of the Jewish
population in Europe. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, at
<http://www.ushmm.orgloutreach/fsol.htm> (last visited Jan. 11, 2001). The "Final Solution," the plan
instituted by the Nazis to exterminate the Jewish population, resulted in the deaths of over three million Jews
in gas chambers in extermination camps. Id. Other Jews faced death by shooting conducted by mobile
killing squads. Id. "In its entirety, the 'Final Solution' consisted of gassings, shootings, random acts of
terror, disease, and starvation that accounted for the deaths of about six million Jews-two-thirds of
European Jewry." Id.
6. See Boyd, supra note 4, at Part IV.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994). The ATCA provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a-treaty of the
United States." Id.
8. For a thorough discussion of the ATCA, see THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS Aer: AN ANALYTICAL
ANTHOLOGY (Ralph G. Steinhardt & Anthony D'Amato eds., 1999). See also Hari M. Osofsky,
Environmental Human Rights Under the Alien Tort Statute: Redress for Indigenous Victims of
Multinational Corporations, 20 SUFF:LKTRANSNAT'LL. REV. 335,351-68 (1997) (delineating the ATCA
requirements). Brad Kieserman presents a compelling argument for the shortcomings of the ATCA and the
necessary amendments to remedy the problem in his article, Profits and Principles: Promoting
Multinational Corporate Responsibility by Amending the Alien Tort Claims Act, 48 CATH. U.L. REV.
881, 887-88 (1999):
Only one ATCA suit against a private corporate defendant, however, has survived even a
motion for summary judgement. This dearth of sustainable cases against private defendants
flows from a combination of vague statutory language and judicial interpretations imposing a
state action requirement for most claims. Ultimately, this conflict over the meaning and
application of the statute weakens the effectiveness of ATCA litigation in two ways. First, the
statute fails to define actionable claims with sufficient precision to serve as the basis for a well-
pleaded complaint or provide meaningful guidance for lawful transnational corporate conduct.
Second, courts apply, inconsistent judicial interpretations of American constitutional standards
to determine whether U.S.-based MNCs are liable for the actions of foreign sovereigns affecting
their own nationals. Thus, because our domestic law does not incorporate specific "alien torts"
orregulate the relationship between U.S.-based corporations and their foreign host-governments,
MNCs can evade liability for their role in overseas human rights violations.
Id.
850
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respect human rights, then the granting of a remedy solidifies the
corporations's legal duty. Accordingly, when a group remedy is enforced
through the class action suit, the group's collective rights are grounded
in a legal norm.9
The true hope of eliminating future human rights violations will arrive only
through corporate compliance with existing international laws preventing
multinational corporations from engaging in alliances with corrupt governments
that cruelly and inhumanely violate human rights norms.'0 Norm enunciation is
only possible as a by-product of this process."
The Federal District Court of New Jersey recently dismissed two exemplary
cases, Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co. 2 and Burger-Fischer v. Degussa. 3 Joining all
persons similarly situated, Iwanowa represented the Plaintiff class in an action
against Ford Werke and Ford Motor Company, alleging that Defendants forced the
class to perform slave labor. 4 Seeking disgorgement of profits, damages to
compensate for the reasonable value of her labor, and damages for subjecting her
to such inhumane conditions, Iwanowa made claims both against Ford Werke for
the human rights abuses and against Ford Motor Co., as part owner of the
company during World War I1.'" The Ford Defendants moved to dismiss under
multiple grounds; the court denied their motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under the law of nations 6 but granted their motions to dismiss
9. Boyd, supra note 4, at 1182.
10. See id. at 1193-1200.
II. Id. at 1213.
12. 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999).
13. 65 F. Supp. 2d248 (D.N.J. 1999).
14. lwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 434. The class consisted of thousands of people subjected to slave
labor by Ford Werke between 1941 and 1945. id.
15. See id. at 431-32. Ford Motor Co.'s ownership of Ford Werke during the World War II period was
between 52% and 75% of its outstanding shares. As a consequence of the slave labor Ford Werke instituted
between 1939 and 1943, its profits doubled. Id. at 433. By 1941, Ford Werke completely became a
military operation, manufacturing solely military trucks. Id. at 432. Its production of three-ton military
trucks accounted for approximately 60% of all the German army's World War 11 supply. Id.
16. Id. at 434, 438. The court found that, under the ATCA, it could properly claim jurisdiction for
claims arising under customary international law. See id. at 438-39. Furthermore, Plaintiffs' claims
properly relied upon the law of nations, law evidenced by the Hague and Geneva Conventions. See id. at
439. Finding that the ATCA conferred jurisdiction over the court, the court analyzed the requisite elements
for finding such jurisdiction: "(I) an alien sues (2) for a tort (3) committed in violation ofthe law of nations
(i.e., international law)." Id. (quoting Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995)).
Finding the first two prongs easily satisfied, the court then discussed the Nuremberg Tribunals,
holding that the World War II enslavement, deportation, and extermination of civilians violated customary
international law and constituted crimes against humanity. id. at 440-41. The court also examined case
law, repeatedly holding that slave labor and genocide fundamentally violate the law of nations. See id.
on grounds that the statute of limitations barred all claims, 7 that the complaint
In response to the use of ATCA to bring the action, Defendants claimed that it does not grant the court
jurisdiction because there is no private right of action under the Act and it applies only to state actors. See
id. at 441. The court first rejected Defendants' understanding of the ATCA, in which they claimed that
district court jurisdiction over aliens' claims brought under the law of nations is proper only in instances
where Congress expressly enacts specific legislation enabling the courts to adjudicate these claims, as
narrow and disunified from the current stance of courts. See id. at 441-42. The majority of courts find, in
opposition to Defendants' view, that "the ATCA provides both subject matter jurisdiction and a cause of
action for claims alleging violations of customary international law." Id. Furthermore, the court noted that
had Congress intended something other than this interpretation of the Act, it likely would have amended it
to reflect the proper interpretation. See id. at 442-43. Additionally, the court found that the language of
the Act, which requires an act "committed in violation" of a norm, conforms with the notion that Congress
did not intend that aliens, before claiming relief under ATCA, be compelled to use an enabling statute to
assert their claim. Id. at 443.
The court next addressed Defendants' second assertion, that the ATCA applies only to state actors,
"because such norms bind only states and its agents, not private corporations such as Defendants." Id.
Relying on the Second Circuit's decision in Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2nd Cir. 1995), the court
concluded that there exists some conduct which violates the law of nations irrespective of whether the actor
is acting on behalf of a state or simply as a private individual. The court further reasoned that even courts
that found the ATCA was not implicated in instances where the actor was a private individual recognized
the potential applicability in other cases. See id. at 443-45. The court agreed with Kadic and held that in
cases such as this one involving genocide and war crimes, the ATCA provides a cause of action against the
private actor. See id. at 445. Furthermore, the court reasoned that Defendants' act of deporting civilians
to slave labor camps was a war crime, thereby qualifying the case for federal jurisdiction under the ATCA.
See id. The court rationalized its finding against contrary findings in other circuits by: showing that the
Kadic decision is more current than the other decisions and therefore controls; reasoning that "the Ninth
Circuit later distanced itself from its statement in In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos that only state actors
are liable for violations of international law"; and recognizing that none of the cases which refused to
acknowledge a private ACTA cause of action involved slave labor. Id. at 445.
At the end of its discussion, the court found that although it held there is a private cause of action
under the ATCA, the issue was not relevant to the case at bar because Defendants conceded that they were
de facto state actors, which made them liable "under all possible interpretations of the ATCA." Id. at 445-
46. However, this assertion does not negate the importance of the decision for purposes of future human
rights claims brought under the ATCA.
17. Id. at 461-69, 475. The court discussed the statute of limitations in three sections: claims made
under the law of nations, claims under U.S. law, and claims under German law. Id.
The court found that claims made under the law of nations against Ford Werke and Ford Motor Co.
were subject to a ten-year statute of limitation because, although the ATCA does not contain a limitation,
the court chose to use the most analogous statute, the Torture Victim Protection Act, providing that ten-year
period. Id. at 462, Additionally, the court held that claims against Ford Motor Co. were not subject to
tolling under any treaty because the company is a U.S. company. Id. at 466-67. Furthermore, the court
rejected Plaintiff Iwanowa's claim that she did not bring the claim against Ford Motor Co. on time because
the court would have dismissed them under Rule 19 for failure to join a necessary party or for interference
with a treaty's deferral scheme. Id. However, the court held that Plaintiffs' claims against Ford Werke were
tolled by the Paris Reparations Treaty from 1945 until 1953 and by the London Debt Agreement from 1953
to 1991. Id. at 463-65 (refusing, however, to hold that the statute of limitations was further tolled until
1997, when a court explicitly held that the'2+4 Treaty lifted the London Debt Agreement and thereby
stopped the tolling). Id. at 465-66. Additionally, the court found that equitable tolling, alleged by the
Plaintiff class to extend the limitation period, did not apply because Plaintiffs failed to allege the requisite
elements of misrepresentation and concealment. Id. at 467-68.
Examining the statute of limitations on claims brought under U.S. law, the court found all claims
expired under the state statutes. Id. at 472-76. Furthermore, the court refused to toll the statute of
limitations because Plaintiffs alleged only tolling under German law in her complaint. Id. at 475-76.
Accordingly, the court refused to address the issue. Id.
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failed to state a claim under which relief could be granted, 1" that the claims were
nonjusticiable, 9 and that resolution of the suit would violate international
comity.2' The district court dismissed Iwanowa's action with prejudice for failure
to state a claim on which relief could be granted, as well as for nonjusticiability of
the claims.2'
Burger-Fischer v. Degussa was consolidated from class actions against
Degussa AG, Degussa Corporation (Degussa AG's American subsidiary, wholly-
owned by Degussa),22 and Siemens AG.' The Plaintiff class alleged violations of
customary international law and German law for refining gold seized from Nazi
Finally, the court examined the statute of limitations on claims brought under German law. See id.
at 476-82. The court found that German law mandated the use of the expired German statute of limitations.
Id. at 476-77. Additionally, the court rejected Iwanowa's argument that the German statute of limitations
provision, mandating the return of property which was wrongly acquired even after the statute has run,
protected her claims. Id. at 477-79.
18. Id. at 434, 446-61. Defendants made several motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted on many grounds under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See id. Their claims included
that the Paris Reparations Treaty subsumed Iwanowa's claims, that the claims were time-barred, and that
the U.S.S.R. waived her claims. See id. at 446.
The Paris Reparations Treaty does not preserve a cause of action by Iwanowa and the class. See id.
at 448-51. The only provision in the Treaty which preserved the right for individual victims to bring claims
against the German Government required that the individual be a "nonrepatriable victim of German
Action." Id. at 450-51 (quoting Paris Reparations Treaty, Part I, Art. 8, § I). Because Iwanowa failed to
allege that status, the court assumed instead that she was subject to the general provision:
The Signatory Governments agree among themselves that their respective shards of reparation,
as determined by the present Agreement, shall be regarded by each of them as covering all its
claims and those of its nationals against the former German Government and its Agencies, of
a governmental or private nature arising out of the war.
Id. at 449 (quoting Paris Reparations Treaty, Part I, Art. 2.A). Accordingly, the Treaty barred her claims.
See id. at 451. For a thorough discussion of Defendants' motion to dismiss alleging that the action is time-
barred, see supra note 17.
The final 12(b)(6) motion Defendants brought alleged that under the U.S.S.R. Waiver, a treaty under
which the nation agreed to waive all further reparations from the G.D.R., the signatories waived not only
the country's right to seek more payments from Germany, but also the right for Soviet citizens to file slave
labor claims against Germany or its corporations. See lwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 468-69. The court
denied the motion, reasoning that Defendants cited no German civil law to support that position, and the
Waiver, even if it might potentially apply in some instances, failed here because it does not apply to German
companies. See id.
19. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 432,434, 483-89. This paper primarily discusses the impropriety of
dismissing human rights cases for nonjusticiability under the political question doctrine. Examining the
Iwanowa and Burger-Fischer cases is instructive to understand the rationale of the court in applying the
doctrine and why that reasoning is improper and erroneous, both for these cases and for other human rights
mass tort litigation. For a thorough discussion of the political question doctrine and the rationale for finding
it inapplicable in these cases, see infra Parts III & IV.
20. lwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 431-32,434,489-91.
21. Id. at432,489-90.
22. Burger-Fischer v. Degussa, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248,250 n.I (D.N.J. 1999).
23. Id. at 250.
concentration camp victims, fully knowing its source; manufacturing Zyklon B,
the gas used in gas chambers for mass executions; and, on the part of Siemens,
using slave labor provided by the Nazi regime.24 Seeking damages or restitution
against Degussa for both refining victims' stolen gold and for providing Zyklon
B to the Nazis, as well as damages from Degussa and Siemens under a compensa-
tion theory for slave labor and oppressive conditions in which Defendants
compelled them to work, the Plaintiff class brought their actions under federal
question jurisdiction,' diversity jurisdiction,26 and supplemental jurisdiction.27
The court held that the claims were sustained by a post-war treaty and dismissed
them for lack of justiciability under the political question doctrine.28
This article discusses the implications of the political question doctrine on
mass tort claims stemming from international human rights violations, concluding
that the use of the doctrine is inappropriate for both practical procedural reasons
and for policy reasons. Part II defines and analyzes the political question doctrine,
outlining its current direction in the context of human rights mass tort litigation.
Part III discusses the recent history of human rights litigation in the context of
class actions litigated in U.S. courts. Part IV discusses whether the political
question doctrine is truly at issue in these human rights cases, concluding that the
doctrine is not relevant, while Part V asserts that even if the court does legiti-
mately get to the political question doctrine issue, then it does not apply.
II. HISTORY AND MODERN MOVEMENT OF THE POLITICAL QUESTION
DOCTRINE
A. Constitutional Grounding
Regarded as "the most confusing of the justiciability doctrines,"'29 the political
question doctrine emerged in 1803 in Marbury v. Madison.3" The Supreme Court
24. Id.
25. 28U.S.C.§ 1331 (1994).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994).
28. See Burger-Fischer, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 282.
29. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDIcrION § 2.6.1, at 143 (3d ed. 1999). Chemerinsky
considers the political question doctrine the most confusing because it is a misnomer in that courts
frequently decide political issues. Id. at 144. Citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974),
Chemerinsky illustrates that the title of the doctrine does not correlate strictly to its meaning, as the Supreme
Court has long participated in the political process. Id. (citing Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927),
as an example of the Supreme Court participating in the political process by ending racial discrimination
in primaries and elections). Additionally, Chemerinsky finds the doctrine to be so confusing because the
Court's definition of the doctrine has changed considerably since the genesis of the idea. Id. For further
discussion regarding the evolution of the doctrine, see infra note 30.
30. Id.; Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 170 (1803). Chemerinsky claims that, since Marbury, the
Court's then-narrow definition and application ofthe political question doctrine continually faced expansion
to reach its present definition and application, which includes claims of constitutional violations resulting
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envisioned the doctrine as something quite distinguishable from the modern
understanding, finding:
[T]he political branches of government were compelled to accept judicial
review and judicial supremacy in the adjudication of interbranch
disputes. At the same time, the Court made a promise to restrain itself
and refrain from deciding cases dealing with the exercise of, to use Chief
Justice Marshall's turn of phrase, "important political powers."'"
However, the Court's opinion in Luther v. Borden32 laid the foundation upon
which the Court bases the modern conception of the political question doctrine.33
In Luther, the Court declined to reach issues regarding "political rights and
political questions,"' finding that the claims challenging the martial law instituted
by the State were nonjusticiable because they challenged competent authority
vested in the charter government.3"
in specific injury. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, § 2.6.1, at 145. Chemerinsky quotes the Court as it first
defined the political question doctrine, through the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court
in Marbury:
By the constitution [sic] of the United States, the President is invested with certain important
political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only
to his country in his political character and to his own conscience .... The subjects are
political.... [B]eing entrusted to the executive, the decision of the executive is conclusive...
. Questions, in their nature political, or which are by the constitution [sic] and laws, submitted
to the executive, can never be made in this court.
Id. at 144 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 165-70). Chemerinsky further explains that the Chief Justice
confined the doctrine to cases which would question the President's unlimited discretion. Id. at 145.
Specifically, Marbury's definition prevented the possibility of alleging a constitutional violation in any area
where the President maintains, under the Constitution, plenary authority. Id. Modernly, a wider definition
of political question creates a second layer of analysis (whereas under Marbury, any time a plaintiff had
standing, the political question doctrine could not bar his claim), under which the doctrine now includes
individuals who claim constitutional violations where they suffered a specific injury. Id. Chemerinsky
opines that what makes the doctrine even more confusing is the lack of explicit language by the Court to
explain its differing interpretations and uses of the doctrines. See id. at 145-46.
31. David J. Bederman, Deference or Deception: Treaty Rights as Political Questions, 70 U. CoLO.
L. REV. 1439, 1441-42 (1999). Bederman's article examines the use of the political question doctrine in
the adjudication of cases dealing with treaty rights and finds that "there is very real cause for concern in
unbridled judicial deference to executive branch decision making in the foreign relations area." Id. at 1440.
32. 48U.S. 1(7 How.) (1849).
33. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, at 150-51.
34. Luther, 48 U.S. at 46.
35. See id. at 34, 46-47. Plaintiffs sued for trespass, to which Defendants responded that, as members
of the state's military, they were simply trying to protect the state from potential insurrection after a
competent authority declared the State subject to martial law. Id. at 34. Before the Court was willing to
regard the merits of the case, it found it must assume "its duty to examine very carefully its own powers
before it undertakes to exercise jurisdiction." Id. at 39. Therefore, the ramifications of deciding the
Taking a closer look at the power disbursement of government, the Court
recognized its role as one which "presupposes an established government," the
authority of which, should it be annulled, would devastate also the power of the
courts.36 Additionally, the Court had a vested interest in staying its hands from
these issues as a necessary requirement to ensure cooperation among the various
governmental powers, which, in turn, protects its judicial authority.37 Reasoning
that under the separation of powers inherent in our Constitution Congress is
granted the authority to ensure a republican government," the Luther v. Borden
Court gave great merit to preservation of each branch's power as preventative
against anarchy,39 holding that the judiciary would overstep its boundaries should
it decide whether the people of the state properly displaced the existing charter
government.'
After Luther v. Borden, courts generally found Guarantee Clause questions
nonjusticiable based on the political question doctrine,4 until the 1962 Baker v.
Carr decision.4 2  Faced with an issue regarding the constitutionality of a
reapportionment statute, the Baker Court found the Equal Protection Clause claim
justiciable, reversing the district court's dismissal of the claim as a political
"existence and authority" of the charter government extended, in the Court's eye, to questioning the central
powers of the government, and forced the deduction that, if the charter government was not in existence
during the alleged trespass, then that same government's legislation, taxes, salaries, compensations, and
judgments of its courts were decidedly void. Id. at 38-39. Specifically, Plaintiffs called into question the
"existence and authority of the government under which defendants acted," because Plaintiffs believed that
Defendants were actually the ones in opposition to lawful State authority. Id. at 35.
36. Id. at 40.
37. See id.
38. Id. at 42; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union
a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of
the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic
Violence."). In a 1795 act, Congress acted within their constitutionally granted power and provided that
the President possessed authority to enlist, on behalf of any state, the aid of the militia of any other states
necessary to suppress an insurrection. Luther, 48 U.S. at 43.
39. See Luther, 48 U.S. at 43. The Court reasoned:
If the judicial power extends so far, the guarantee contained in the Constitution of the United
States is a guarantee of anarchy, and not of order. Yet if this right does not reside in the courts
when the conflict is raging, if the judicial power is at that time bound to follow the decision of
the political, it must be equally bound when the contest is over. It cannot, when peace is
restored, punish as offenses and crimes the acts which it before recognized, and was bound to
recognize, as lawful.
Id.
40. Id. at 35, 47. Plaintiffs argued that the people of Rhode Island annulled the charter government
before Defendants allegedly trespassed, and therefore, Defendants acted improperly undercurrent law. Id.
at 35. The Court did not reach the issue because they found it reserved to the political power rather than
to the judicial power, therefore binding the Court to accept the political decision as the "paramount law of
the state." Id. at 39. "Judicial power presupposes an established government capable of enacting laws and
enforcing their execution .... " Id. at 40.
41. PETER W. Low & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE
RELATIONS 433 (4th ed. 1998).
42. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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question.43 Reasoning that "the mere fact that the suit seeks protection of a
political right does not mean it presents a political question," the Court found
Defendants' line of reasoning, in which they analogized apportionment cases to
generally nonjusticiable Guarantee Clause claims, unsound and conclusory.' The
Court heeded Plaintiffs' protest to this characterization of their claim by
recognizing that the Guarantee Clause cases dismissed on justiciability grounds
were dismissed based on the "relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate
branches of the Federal Government, and not [on] the federal judiciary's
relationship to the States, which gives rise to the 'political question."' 45
B. The Political Question Test Emerges
In its Baker decision, the Court outlined a new test, under which courts must
find one of a set of factors present in a manner that renders it "inextricable from
the case at bar" in order to find the case nonjusticiable as a political question.'
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, outlined the factors:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question
is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department;47 or a lack of judicially discoverable
43. Id. at 187-88. Thecomplaintallegedthatthe 1901 statutecausedmalapportionmentoftheGeneral
assembly of Tennessee. Id. at 192-93. Claiming that the malapportionment created unequal protection of
the laws for voters in more populous districts (because they were not given representatives based on
population), Plaintiffs sought: a declaration that the statute was unconstitutional; an injunction prohibiting
Defendants from using the unconstitutional statute to conduct any further elections; and an ultimatum that,
should the General Assembly not now enact a valid reapportionment statute, then the district court would
assume the responsibility itself, by either mathematically reapportioning under a constitutional formula or
by forcing Defendants to conduct all future legislative elections at large. Id. at 194-95. The district court
dismissed the action on two grounds, finding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that the
complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Id. at 196. The Court found
problematic the district court's failure to distinguish in its reasoning between these two grounds. See id.
44. See id. at 209. Defendants argued that apportionment cases necessarily involve the constitutional
right that guaranties a republican form of government and that courts hold Guarantee Clause claims
nonjusticiable based on the political question doctrine. See id.
45. Id. at 210. Defendants argued specifically that their claim was justiciable as an equal protection
violation and that, if able to show the requisite discrimination, the relief to which such violation would
entitle them remains unchallenged by any related political rights. Id. at 209-10.
46. See Low & JEFFRIES, supra note 41, at 434.
47. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. This factor replaced the previously held standard that required a "textual
commitment." Thomas C. Berg, Comment, The Guarantee of Republican Government: Proposals for
Judicial Review, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 208, 217 (1987). The appropriate inquiry is, in essence, whether the
question at issue before a court is "more properly decided by a coequal branch of our Government." Davis
v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 122-23 (1986).
This factor is arguably linked to the second factor: evidence that there is a lack of judicially
and manageable standards for resolving it;4" or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; 9 or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government;" or an unusual need for unquestion-
ing adherence to a political question already made;" or the potentiality
of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question. 2
Chemerinsky concludes that the Court's factors represent a grand failing to
articulate what the doctrine is and when it applies. 3 He reasons that the lack of
constitutional text dictating judicial review or limitations thereof indicates that
manageable standards implies that there is likely a textually demonstrable commitment to another branch
of government. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228-29 (1993). Ultimately, Baker asks not for
the determination that the Constitution vests exclusive power in a branch of government over a particular
area, but rather "whether the Constitution has given one of the political branches final responsibility for
interpreting the scope and nature of such a power." Id. at 240 (White, J., concurring).
In Goldwater v. Carter, Justice Powell concluded that there was no textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment to the President to terminate treaties. 444 U.S. 996, 999 (1979) (Powell, J.,
concurring). Davis v. Passman held similarly that where this requirement is not met by the text of the
Constitution,
[W]e presume that justiciable constitutional rights are to be enforced through the courts. And,
unless such rights are to become merely precatory, the class of those litigants who allege that
their own constitutional rights have been violated, and who at the same time have no effective
means other than the judiciary to enforce these rights, must be able to invoke the existing
jurisdiction of the courts for the protection of their justiciable constitutional rights.
442 U.S. 228, 242 (1979).
In determining whether this factor applies, courts must first interpret the text in question and second,
determine whether the issue is textually committed-and, if so, to what extent. See Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486, 519 (1969). For a discussion of the applicability of this factor to the international human
rights violations in question, see infra Part V.A.
48. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. The Court has held that where there exist judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving claims, "[tihose standards forestall reliance by this Court on nonjudicial
'policy determinations' or any showing of disrespect for a coordinate branch." I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919,942 (1983). In Goldwater v. Carter, Justice Powell found it permissible for courts to inquire whether
the President could terminate a treaty in compliance with the Constitution without first obtaining
congressional approval. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 999. According to Justice Powell, such an inquiry was
permissible because it did not review the President's role or activity in foreign affairs, but instead only
questioned the separation of power between Congress and the President. Id. For a discussion of the
applicability of this factor to the international human rights violations in question, see infra Part V.B.
49. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. For a discussion of the applicability of this factor to the international
human rights violations in question, see infra Part V.C.
50. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. For a discussion of the applicability of this factor to the international
human rights violations in question, see infra Part V.D.
51. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. For a discussion of the applicability of this factor to the international
human rights violations in question, see infra Part V.E.
52. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. For a discussion of the applicability of this factor to the international
human rights violations in question, see infra Part V.F.
53. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, at 145-46.
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these standards are inadequate as a measuring device of justiciability.'
C. Use of the Doctrine in Foreign Affairs
The murky nature of the political question doctrine remains despite decades
of decisions since first mentioned in Marbury v. Madison" and first fully invoked
in Luther v. Borden.6 Modernly, the doctrine is experiencing heightened vitality
in foreign affairs. 7 The doctrine serves as a protectorate over United States
foreign policy decisions, shielding executive and legislative decisions from
litigation regarding the propriety of their respective actions. 8 Many of these
decisions concern wartime decisions, such as those made during the Vietnam War,
for example, when a class of taxpayers challenged the American war effort by
naming President Nixon and Melvin Laird, then Secretary of the Department of
Defense, as defendants in Atlee v. Nixon. 9 In this class action to enjoin the
spending of tax dollars on the Vietnam War effort, the Court affirmed the district
court's decision to dismiss the case against the President, thereby shielding him
from suit.' The Court's decision centered around ensuring his ability to carry out
his presidential duties without being distracted by court appearances to defend his
actions.6'
A recent foreign affairs case, 767 Third Avenue Associates v. Consulate
General of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslav, illustrates the varied
contexts in which courts invoke the political question doctrine.62 In this case, the
district court held that the political question doctrine prevented litigation
regarding unpaid balances on rental property.63 After Yugoslavia erupted in civil
war, the United States government expressed its disapproval of the country's
actions by ordering Yugoslav New York offices to close, terminate operations, and
force all staff to leave the country.' Thereafter, the owners of the rented property
brought actions against the individual Yugoslav governmental agencies for the
54. id.
55. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
56. 48 U.S. 1 (7 How.) (1849). See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
57. See Low & JEFFRIES, supra note 41, at 444 (discussing the application of the doctrine as a measure
to defeat litigation questioning the legality of foreign policy adopted by the U.S. government).
58. See id.
59. See 336 F. Supp. 790, 791 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911
(1973).
60. Id. at 792.
61. See id.
62. See 60 F. Supp. 2d 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
63. Id. at 269.
64. Id.
859
unpaid rent remaining on their leases.65
After settlement procedures were unsuccessful with two of the agencies, this
action commenced for the rent due in its entirety against the tenant agencies and
the five new Yugoslav states.' The district court found the claims nonjusticiable
as against the state Defendants under each of the six Baker v. Carr factors.67
Relying on Can v. United States,"8 the court found that successorship questions
were untouchable by the court because their nature destined them for settlement
by negotiation, international institutional procedures, war, and similar resolution
techniques, thereby meeting the second and third factors of the Baker test-"lack
ofjudicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving" claims and"the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for nonjudicial discretion."'69 Furthermore, the court found both the percentage of
each successor's liability and the date of each successor's successorship to be
political questions.70 With regard to the first and fourth factors, the court found
"a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department" factor met by Article II, which grants the executive branch
the authority to recognize foreign governments and thereby exemplifies "the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government."'" Finally, the court
analyzed the fifth and sixth Baker factors as the "risk of inconsistency among
United States governmental bodies."" Primarily, concerns that the judiciary not
encroach upon executive or legislative turf drove the court to find both "an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made" and "the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
65. Id.
66. Id. The five state Defendants included: the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Republic of
Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the
Republic of Slovenia. Plaintiffs included the state Defendants in the action on the grounds that they
inherited the liabilities of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Id.
67. Id. at 272.
68. See 14 F.3d 160, 163 (2dCir. 1994).
69. See ThirdAve. Assoc., 60 F. Supp. 2d at 272. In reaching this conclusion, the Court quoted the
Can court:
[C]ourts have no standards for judging a claim of succession to a former sovereign, even where
that succession is only to property rather than to government power. The recognition of any
rights of succession to a foreign sovereign's power or property is in the first instance
constitutionally committed to the executive branch of government, not to the judiciary.
Id. (quoting Can, 14 F.3d at 163).
70. Id. at 273.
7 I. Id. at 274-75. Article II vests in the President the authority to make treaties, see U.S. CONST. art
II, § 2, cl. 2, and to "receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers," U.S. CONsT. art II, § 3. These two
powers implicitly carry with them the general rule that only the President has the power to recognize foreign
governments.
72. Third Ave. Assoc., 60 F. Supp. at 275.
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departments on one question."73 Consequently, the court stayed its hands from
resolution of these issues.74
Justice Powell's review of Goldwater v. Carter added another dimension to
the already puzzling Baker factor test.7" Justice Powell found that Baker mandated
three basic inquiries: "(i) Does the issue involve resolution of questions committed
by the text of the Constitution to a coordinate branch of Government?[;] (ii) Would
resolution of the question demand that a court move beyond areas of judicial
expertise?[;] (iii) Do prudential considerations counsel against judicial interven-
tion?"76 However, Justice Powell's analysis, which discusses some, but not all, of
the Baker criteria, leaves unanswered the basis upon which the Court analyzed
only certain of the Baker factors.77
The modern trend of these cases has done very little to clarify the murky
nature of the political question rule or solidify the manner in which courts should
examine the factors' applicability to a set of given facts. In United States v.
73. Id. The court reached this conclusion in light of the potential conflict between courts addressing
the allocation of assets between Yugoslav successors. Id.
74. See id. The court added an interesting caveat to its opinion:
Consequently, allocation of SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] assets or
liabilities became a political question in this court once the other district courts so held, even if
this court believed that it otherwise would not be a political question. While the traditional
process of conforming judicial rulings-circuit efforts to resolve district court splits; Supreme
Court efforts to resolve circuit splits-is far from an ideal way to conduct foreign policy, the
Second Circuit at least has authority, unlike this court, to prevent inconsistent foreign affairs
pronouncements within this district and circuit. To the extent that the prior political question
holdings in this district are incorrect, only the Second Circuit, not this court, can issue a holding
that conforms the district courts and thus reduces the amount of dangerous inconsistency that
the judiciary would be inserting into United States policy regarding SFRY succession.
Id. at 275-76.
The tragedy of this opinion is that the court appears to not really believe in the decision it made.
Maybe the outcome here is right, but the ramifications of the decisions may be much greater than intended
because courts will ultimately compromise justice if they follow this quality of shallow reasoning that
allowed them to placidly agree with other districts. In cases where aberration of human rights inspires
litigation, such self-serving reasoning by courts may cause problems beyond the contemplation ofthe district
court when it was dealing with a squabble over unpaid rent.
Assuming that the Southern District of New York Court got it right here, the facts in this case
absolutely distinguish its finding of political question from any possible holding in the mass tort human
rights cases. The action here, brought by American citizens against the Yugoslav governmental agencies,
was the result of the United States government forcing them to evacuate the country. See supra notes 62-65
and accompanying text. lwanowa, Burger-Fischer, and other human rights mass tort cases are instead the
product of systematic abuses of intemational law, resulting in egregious harm. The judiciary simply cannot
equitably apply the political question doctrine to these claims. See infra Part IV.
75. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
76. Id. at 998.
77. Id. After considering only the three inquiries previously enumerated, Justice Powell ended his
analysis without addressing the other Baker factors.
Munoz-Flores, the Supreme Court clarified that, contrary to the government's
argument that where individual rights are not involved there exists no right to the
constitutional separation of powers protections, the identity of the litigant in a case
is immaterial to the political question doctrine.78 Although ultimately the Court
found the doctrine not implicated, the Court's only real contribution towards any
sense of clarity the doctrine may possess was its analysis of the prong of the Baker
test that renders nonjusticiable any case that expresses a "lack of. . . respect" for
a coordinate branch of government.79 Specifically, the Court found the govern-
ment's allegations that adjudication of the issue would disrespect the House of
Representatives by questioning their legislative authority or the propriety of a bill
they passed to be insufficient grounds for rendering the issue a political question.S'
In 1993, the Court again addressed the political question issue in Nixon v.
United States, holding that the Court must stay its hands from the issue of a
Senate Rule's constitutionality.8' There, the Court emphasized the importance of
first interpreting the text of the Constitution and determining "to what degree the
issue is textually committed."82  Furthermore, the Court found that textual
commitment is not wholly separate from the determination that there is a "lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving" the conflict-it
may be that the lack ofjudicial manageability is determinative in finding a textual
constitutional commitment to a government branch.83 Despite the clarity of the
Court's assertion that the Baker factors overlap significantly and are inter-
dependent, the failure of the Court to explain the implications of the relationships
and how courts should interpret the factors based on the relationships between
them serves only to confound the ability of lower courts to apply the law.'
III. RECENT HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS MASS TORTS
Collectivized human rights claims recently appeared on the U.S. judicial
docket, introducing a new form of class action. This emergence has caused much
78. 495 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1990).
79. See id. at 390.
80. Id. at 390-391. Munoz-Florez was prosecuted for helping aliens evade immigration officers. Id.
at 388. He moved to correct his sentence, claiming that the judgment against him, provided for by a House
bill, violated the Origination Clause. Id. The government asserted that to invalidate a bill passed by the
House on Origination Clause grounds would demonstrate disrespect for Congress' judgement. Id. at 390.
The Court refused to heed the government's reasoning, finding "such congressional consideration of
constitutional questions does not foreclose subsequent judicial scrutiny of the law's constitutionality." Id.
at 39 1. What is most startling about this opinion, however, is that after more than twenty-five years since
the Baker factors emerged, in an effort to "clarify" the murky law preceding it (dating back to Marbury v.
Madison), the law was muddled enough over this issue that a fundamental function of the judiciary, to test
the constitutionality of congressional enactments, was called into question. See id.
81. 506 U.S. 224, 226 (1993).
82. See id. at 228.
83. See id. at 228-29.
84. See id.
862
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debate over whether U.S. courts provide an appropriate forum for this litigation."
These cases allege systematic conduct by defendant corporations, giving rise to a
class of people harmed by that conduct."
A. Holocaust Litigation
Recent cases include claims by Holocaust survivors or families of those killed
in the Holocaust, claiming international human rights violations, such as slave
labor, looting of assets, murder, and torture.87 Settled claims, including those
stemming from the Swiss Bank cases, act as an encouragement for other human
rights victims to file claims seeking restitution and for defendant corporations,
once served, to settle claims."8 Over forty other corporations are defendants in
actions currently pending in federal courts.89
85. Some academics advocate the litigation of these claims in U.S. courts because, through judicial
enforcement, corporations may be forced to comply with international human rights law. Theresulting norm
enunciation creates a remedy for those who might otherwise receive no recovery for damages they incurred
as a result of gross violations of human rights. See Boyd, supra note 4, at 1173-89.
86. See Anita Ramasastry, Secrets and Lies? Swiss Banks and International Human Rights, 31
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 325,332-33 (1998). Ramasastry's article explores the Swiss Bank litigation and
other human rights violations by corporations, calling courts to more clear and effective legal standards and
international legal mechanisms. Id. at 449-54.
87. See Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); In re Austrian and German
Bank Holocaust Litigation, 80 F. Supp. 2d 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); In re Nazi Era Cases Against German
Defendants Litig., 2000 WL 1876641 (D.N.J. Dec. 5,2000); In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F.
Supp. 2d 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (No. 96 Civ. 4849); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Corp., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424
(D.N.J. 1999); Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248 (D.N.J. 1999); Doe v. Unocal Corp.,
963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997);
Aguinda v. Texaco, 1994 WL 142006 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
88. This proposition illustrates the importance of the doctrine's applicability to cases involving
international human rights abuses. Dismissing these claims as nonjusticiable will thwart the goals of
corporate compliance. Absent measures encouraging and ensuring corporate compliance, the pattern of
human rights abuses will likely continue and perhaps augment. For a discussion concerning the role of
corporate compliance as a form of norm enunciation, see Boyd, supra note 4, at 1193-1200.
89. The list includes: Adam Apel AG; Albert Ackerman G m b H & Co KG; Alcatel Sel AG; Audi AG;
BASF AG; Bayer AG; Bayeriche Motoren Werke AG; Beiersdorf AG; Robert Bosch G m b H; Hugo Boss
AG; Continental AG; Daimler-Benz AG; Daimler-Chrysler AG; Deutsche Lufthansa AG; Diehl G m b H
& Co.; Dunlopp AG; Durkopp AG; Durkopp Alder AG; Dycherhoff AG; Ford Werke AG; Franz Haniel
& Cie AG; Fried Krupp AG AG Hoesch-Krupp; Heidelberger Zeurent AG; Henkel KGAA; Hoechst AG;
Leica Camera AG; Leonard-Moll AG; Magna International, Inc.; Man AG; Mannesman AG; Optische
Werke G. Rodenstock; Phillip Holzman AG; Rheinmetal Group; Schering AG; Steir-Daimler-Puck AG;
Stiftung & Co.; Thyssen AG; Varta AG; VIAG; Voest AG; Volkswagen AG; Wurttembergissche
Metallwarenfabrick AG. Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 281-82 (D.N.J. 1999).
B. Cultural Genocide
Other human rights violations include claims brought by indigenous people
for cultural genocide and environmental damages.' For example, in In re Estate
of Marcos, a class of victims tortured during a period of martial law brought an
action against Ferdinand Marcos, former president of the Philippines, for human
rights violations.9 After his second (and, under then current Filipino law, last)
constitutional term of presidency, Marcos declared a state of martial law on the
land and rewrote his country's constitution to accommodate his harsh practices,
thereby ensuring compliance of the people with his regime.'
The class action against him resulted from human rights violations including
rape, torture, and confinement that occurred during interrogations conducted to
investigate opposition to his regime.93 Both the district court and two circuit
courts validated a statistical sampling method of arriving at damages which the
Plaintiff class won for the violations. 4 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment
against the estate and refused to heed the estate's due process challenges against
the statistical sampling method.9'
Another example of the cultural genocide cases brought as human rights mass
torts, Kadic v. Karadzic, was the result of the "genocide, rape, forced prostitution
and impregnation, torture and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment,
assault and battery, sex and ethnic inequality, summary execution, and wrongful
death" suffered by Croat and Muslim citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina.96 Plaintiffs
alleged that these acts were part of a "genocidal campaign" during the Bosnian
civil war.97 The Second Circuit reversed the lower court's ruling that there was
90. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc.,
969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997), cert. denied, 724 So. 2d 734 (La. S. Ct. 1998); Aguinda v. Texaco,
Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated sub nom. Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2nd Cir.
1998); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996); In re Estate
of Marcos, 910 F. Supp. 1460 (D. Haw. 1995), affd sub nom. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767
(9th Cir. 1996).
91. 910 F. Supp. at 1461-62 (D. Haw. 1995).
92. Id. at 1462-63.
93. Id. at 1463.
94. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767,782-83 (9th Cir. 1996); see Trajano v. Marcos, No. 86-
2448, 1989 WL 76894 (9th Cir. July 10, 1989). Trajano is a consolidated appeal challenging district court
holdings in California and Hawaii which found Plaintiffs' claims nonjusticiable under a doctrine which
parallels the political question doctrine. See id. at *1-2. The district courts used the act of state doctrine
because they claimed the "inquiry these cases would require into the official acts of a foreign head of state
was beyond the capacity or function of the federal courts." See id. at *2. The Ninth Circuit disagreed,
finding instead that once a dictator is no longer in dictatorship, he may be reached judicially. See id.
Furthermore, the court found that there was no need to prevent the government of either the Philippines or
the United States, where he resided until his death, from being embarrassed by the litigation. See id.
95. Hilao, 103 F.3d at 782-87.
96. 70 F.3d 232, 236-37 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied 518 U.S. 1005 (1996).
97. Id. at 237.
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no subject matter jurisdiction and remanded the case to the district court for a
determination of Karadzic's liability.98 These cases are instructive in that they
illustrate the startling nature of the human rights mass tort cases and the
correlating need for remedy.
IV. POLITICAL QUESTION: A QUERY THE COURT NEED NOT MAKE
In the confusion surrounding the political question doctrine and its applica-
tion, scholars and all students of the law must pause to ask why our courts apply
this doctrine and what ends it serves. The most troubling question regarding the
doctrine is why simply giving deference to the other branches of the government
is not adequate to meet its goals.' Its application to cases involving treaties is
instructive, particularly in the arena of human rights mass tort litigation, because
treaties often lie at the heart of the relationship between the involved countries. "
"The presence or absence of treaty rights in various contexts has proven to be an
intensely contentious issue, a paradigmatic political question. ' '
In Professor Bederman's article detailing the problems with application of the
political question doctrine to cases involving treaty rights, he reminds us of the
origins of the doctrine."° The political question doctrine envisioned by Chief
Justice Marshall was a simple one: "[T]he political branches of government were
compelled to accept judicial review and judicial supremacy in the adjudication of
interbranch disputes ... [and] the Court made a promise to restrain itself and
refrain from deciding cases dealing with the exercise of. . . 'important political
powers.""'' 03 It is here that Professor Bederman summarizes our courts' applica-
tion of the doctrine as an effort "to duck a whole panoply of important issues.""
Professor Bederman clearly articulates the fundamental dysfunction of the
doctrine by illustrating that the doctrine actually facilitates commission of an evil
it supposedly aims to prevent. 5 Namely, it gives both the executive and
legislative branches "the power to dictate [their] own exclusive competence in
98. Id. at 236. The Second Circuit found subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims, personal
jurisdiction over Karadzic, and justiciability of the claims. Id. at 238-50. The court's reasoning for holding
the claims justiciable and refusing to dismiss under the political question doctrine are discussed infra, notes
154-58 and accompanying text.
99. Bederman, supra note 31, at 1439-40.
100. See id. at 1440. Professor Bederman describes the exponential growth of this type of litigation
involving treaties over recent years.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1442.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 1442-43.
various realms of policy and governance," because it removes from the judiciary
the capacity to decide the scope of its powers and vests all decision-making in the
other branches."°
Iwanowa and Burger-Fischer both relied heavily on the international tribunals
governing international relations with the countries against whom their grievances
lay."°t Treaties were at the heart of the use of the political question doctrine in
both Burger-Fischer"° and Iwanowa.'°  In Iwanowa, the court held that the
doctrine barred adjudication of the claims under at least four of the Baker factors,
largely based on treaties and tribunals into which the United States previously
entered.l1 °
The District Court of New Jersey's application of the political question
doctrine to human rights mass torts in Iwanowa and Burger-Fischer is instructive
in analyzing why the query is neither appropriate nor, if made, correctly analyzed.
This section will trace the reasoning of the Iwanowa and Burger-Fischer courts
and then explain the rationale for the basic rule and why, in human rights mass
tort litigation, the political question doctrine is a nonissue.
A. Application of the Rule in International Human Rights Cases:
Landmark Dismissals
Iwanowa Defendants Ford Motor Co. and Ford Werke A.G. moved to dismiss
the class action against them based on the political question doctrine."'
Defendants asserted that the action was nonjusticiable because the "2 + 4
Treaty""' with Germany completely settled the issue of reparations, making their
claim a political question subject to resolution solely by the executive branch." 3
106. See id. at 1442-45.
107. See Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F.2d 424,447-60 (D.N.J. 1999); Burger-Fischer v. Degussa
AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 262-72 (D.N.J. 1999). Some scholars argue the merits of adopting a political
question doctrine for use in the World Court. See Marcella David, Passport to Justice: Internationalizing
the Political Question Doctrine for Application in the World Court, 40 HARv. INT'L L.J. 81, 81-82
(1999). The U.N. Charter "does not lodge exclusive, authoritative powers of interpretation in any single
organ," and therefore the doctrine is not necessary to clarify where those lines lie. See id. at 82.
Furthermore, by "internationalizing" the doctrine, the conflict between the discretion of the Security Counsel
and challenges to that discretion, both of which seem valid, may arrive at last at resolution. See id.
108. See 65 F. Supp. at 262-73.
109. See 67 F. Supp. 2d at 457-60.
110. Id. at 483-89.
111. Id.
112. The "2+4 Treaty" refers to the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, September
12, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1196. Burger-Fischer, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 272. The Treaty neither abolished the
previous agreements nor added any additional terms regarding reparations. Id. Rather, the Treaty simply
represented the final peace treaty, leaving in tact the Transition Agreement and the bilateral treaties. Id. at
279.
113. See Burger-Fischer, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 256. In response, Plaintiffs contended: the Treaty did not
subsume the claims, in accord with the decision by the German Federal Constitutional Court; that Plaintiffs'
private law claims for disgorgement of profits were not for war reparations and therefore could not be
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Plaintiffs relied on the 1953 London Debt Agreement, which carved out an
exception against waiver of claims made by private parties against German
corporations, as long as the parties could bring these claims after final resolution
of reparations issues."4 However, the New Jersey District Court found Plaintiffs'
argument unsatisfactory because it ignored the Transition Agreement of 1954,
dealing with reparations definitively." 5 The court reasoned that the Transition
Agreement governed the claims here because the agreement "recognized that the
victims of Nazi oppression could never be fully compensated for their losses"" 6
and therefore held that all reparation claims "shall be settled by the peace treaty
between Germany and its former enemies or by earlier agreements governing the
matter."' ' Accordingly, the court found the claims nonjusticiable political
questions."8
In determining whether or not the political question inquiry is necessary, the
Iwanowa court delineated reasons the judiciary should stay its hands from
adjudicating foreign policy questions:
(1) the relevant materials in a case involving foreign policy will likely
come from a multitude of sources, including U.S. and foreign sources,
which might be voluminous and thus, potentially unmanageable for
individual courts to handle; (2) there is a distinct possibility that the
parties might not be able to compile all of the relevant information, thus
making any attempt to justify a ruling on the merits of an issue that will
affect the nation, difficult and imprudent; (3) courts cannot predict the
international consequences flowing from a decision on the merits; (4)
there might not be any standards for courts to apply in issuing a decision
on the merits; and (5) courts addressing questions of foreign policy are
considered subsumed by the Treaty anyway; and the Treaty could not subsume legal claims made by
stateless persons seeking relief for customary international human rights law violations. Id. at 256-57.
114. Id. at 277-78. The London Debt Agreement deferred all claims arising out of World War II by
countries and nationals of countries with which Germany was either at war or occupied. See id. at 268.
The purpose of the Treaty was to allow the German economy to stabilize and to "integrate it into the
community of free nations." Id. The Treaty intended to grant Germany the opportunity to gain foreign
credit, but did nothing to alter the previously drafted, yet not in effect, Transition Agreement. Id. at 269.
115. Id. at 277-78. In the Transition Agreement, the guiding reparations Treaty, Germany agreed to
provide restitution to "adequately compensate" victims it persecuted based on race and religion. Id. at 268
(citing "Transaction Agreement," Oct. 23, 1954,332 U.H.T.S. 219, Ch. 6, art. 1). The idea of the Treaty
was to enable Germany to recover financially and stabilize so that the country would be able to provide
restitution to its victims. Id. at 278.
116. Id. at 278.
117. Id. (quoting "Transition Agreement," Oct. 23, 1954, 332 U.H.T.S. 219, Ch. 6, art. I).
118. Id. at 282. The court found each of the Baker indicia of political question to be present to some
extent. For a full discussion, see infra Part V.
faced with the task of reviewing initial determinations made by the
political branches of government, determinations which are constitution-
ally committed to those branches. 9
The district court's decision to inquire into the justiciability of the claims came as
a result of reasoning that the nature of foreign policy is "political,"'"0 likely
because the nature of the suit involved international law and implicated foreign
policy. "'
In Burger-Fischer, the court arrived at the Baker factors as well, but after a
much more thorough, four-part analysis of the appropriateness of the inquiry.'
First, the court determined that the issues at bar were ones involving customary
international law.'23 Second, the court analyzed the private nature of the claims
in the context of reparations. 24 The court distinguished the Burger-Fischer class
claims from claims brought in Filartiga and Kadic, both of which were justiciable,
because the claims at issue evolved out of "corporate action constituting an
integral part of Germany's war effort."'" Furthermore, the court reasoned that the
international law claims at issue now belonged to the victims' state, because they
arose during the course of war. 126 To support their assertion, the court relied on
a Supreme Court case from 1796, Ware v. Hylton,'27 in which the Court
established both that governments representing individuals may assert war-related
claims, rather than individual citizens themselves, and that the peace settlement
at issue extinguished all claims relating to war. 2'
The absurdity of the comparison is self-evident: Claims litigated out of the
Revolutionary War and the Treaty of 1783 at its conclusion are fundamentally
different from claims arising from Hitler's systematic executions of Jews. The
former claims arose out of typical casualties of war, while the later claims arose
out of the Nazi regime's killing spree, which actually spawned World War II,
rather than resulted from the War. 29 The district court failed to consider the
circumstances under which the 1796 opinion was issued and instead continued its
analysis by considering Dames & Moore v. Regan, '30 in which a plaintiff sued the
Iranian government, attaching property to ensure judicial resolution. '" The 1980
119. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 484 (internal citations omitted) (citing Atlee, 347 F. Supp. at 702).
120. See id. at 485.
121. See id. at 484-85.
122. See 65 F. Supp. 2d at 272-82.
123. id. at 272-73.
124. Id. at 273-76.
125. Id. at 273.
126. Id.
127. 3 U.S. 199 (1796) (addressing the Treaty of 1783 ending the Revolutionary War).
128. See Burger-Fischer, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 273-74.
129. See UnitedStates Holocaust MemrorialMuseum, at<http://www.ushnm.orgloutreach/fsol.htm>
(last visited Jan 11, 2001).
130. 453 U.S. 654(1981).
131. See Burger-Fischer, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 274.
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negotiations between the United States and Iran regarding the embassy hostage
crisis yielded a treaty which, among other effects, dissolved the attachments
Plaintiff held against Iran.'32 The Burger-Fischer court attempted to use the
Dames & Moore decision, which held that Congress permitted the President to
make the treaty and it was binding over Plaintiff's case, by analogy to illustrate
that this action was nonjusticiable and was a matter governed exclusively by the
treaty at issue.'33 However, this reasoning is flawed for similar reasons: the evil
that Dames & Moore sought to cure was an attachment on a parcel of property, the
evil in Burger-Fischer and other human rights mass tort litigation is genocide,
slave labor, and torture. "3 The comparison is preposterous and purports to equate
humanity and dignity with property rights. 35 As the Burger-Fischer court itself
noted, Dames & Moore "did not involve a total war and negotiation of reparations.
Its holdings are of limited usefulness in the present case."'36 After taking care to
define "reparations" as inclusive of all damages suffered as a consequence of war,
the court concluded that forced slave labor claims are included in that classifica-
tion. 137 However, the court refused to heed the reasoning of Plaintiffs' expert, Dr.
Wolf:
World War II and the accompanying acts of war must be clearly
distinguished from the unprecedented acts of extermination of the Nazi
regime based on racial motives. The mere temporal coincidence of racial
persecution and acts of war cannot lead to the conclusion that these racial
acts of persecution constitute typical acts of war and therefore the
damages arising out of these acts are covered by the reparation claims.
The indirect connection does not justify viewing these damages as war
damages. 138
The court replied to his assertion, stating that even under this reasoning, only
a small percentage of slave labor claims would merit protection, completely
overlooking Dr. Wolf s statement that these claims are primarily adjudicative not




135. See id. at 275.
136. See id. (citing the Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers of Germany, June
28, 1919, art. 232, Annex I, § 8.2 Bevans 142).
137. Id. at 275-76.
138. Id.
extermination effort and not as a natural by-product of war.'39 As the third part
of its inquiry, the court examined the effect of the Post War Treaties on the
justiciability of the case.'" After tracing the history of the treaties governing
relations among the previously warring nations, the court concluded that the
Transition Agreement 4' both governed the relations between the countries and
sustained all claims arising out of the war.'42 Finally, the court analyzed the
German cases on point and determined that any adjudications in those cases did
not affect the viability of individual claims in United States courts.'43 Accusing
Plaintiffs of trying to "refashion" the reparations schemes in agreements made
between foreign powers, the court refused to entertain any legitimizing factor
which might lead to adjudication.'"
B. Egregious Human Rights Violations: A Class of Its Own
Although in times of war, government, not individuals, decides fairness of the
measures that nations negotiate, precedent exists under which courts can, in
opposition to the New Jersey District Court decisions of Iwanowa and Burger-
Fischer, find that the political question doctrine does not apply in the context of
international human rights mass tort litigation."4 In Republic of the Philippines
v. Marcos,'" the Ninth Circuit held that the case was, in fact, justiciable, and the
political question doctrine did not apply, based upon the nature of the lawsuit."
The court reasoned, "[b]ribetaking, theft, embezzlement, extortion, fraud, and
conspiracy to do these things are all acts susceptible of concrete proofs that need
not involve political questions."'" Both Iwanowa and Burger-Fischer, as well as
all other human rights mass tort cases, receive protection under this reasoning.'49
The correlation is obvious: claims for torts are simply claims for torts. There is
nothing political in their nature; their adjudication is as straight-forward as it
would be were the violations alleged under state law instead of customary
international law,"s° by only American parties.'5
More compelling for purposes of analogy to currently pending human rights
litigation is the Ninth Circuit's observation that Marcos "was not the state, but the
139. Id. at 276.
140. See id. at 276-79.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 116-17.
142. Burger-Fischer, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 278-79.
143. Id. at 279.
144. See id. at 281.
145. See Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1361 (9th Cir. 1988).
146. This case was later consolidated on appeal.




150. See Boyd, supra note 4, at 1141.
151. See Marcos, 862 F.2d at 1361.
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head of the state, bound by the laws that applied to him. Our courts have had no
difficulty in distinguishing the legal acts of a deposed ruler from his acts for
personal profit that lack a basis in law."'52 The parallel here is equally unambigu-
ous: private individuals and corporations should be held liable for acts done under
the auspice of government, just as they would be were the acts done absent any
connection to any government or political party. 1
53
The Second Circuit, in Kadic v. Karadzic, also refused to apply the political
question doctrine to violations of international law."M Before embarking on a
discussion of the six Baker factors,'55 the court clarified that the use of the political
question doctrine as applied in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic'56 did not dictate
its use in the case at bar.'57 Instead, the court emphasized: "Not every case
'touching foreign relations' is nonjusticiable."' 158
The basic rule of the political question doctrine regarding war-time matters
and litigation stemming therefrom simply does not apply in international human
rights mass torts because these crimes go beyond what is typical in war; slave
labor, genocide, and ethnocide are not typical war time casualties and should not
be treated as such. To do so serves to encourage corporations to act at will rather
than to comply with international law.'59
Furthermore, many international human rights mass tort cases are brought
under the ACTA.IW The mere fact that these cases "may involve matters of
foreign law" does not mandate dismissal under the political question doctrine.' 6'
There exists no precedent to dismiss ATCA cases simply because they claim
jurisdiction under this statute. '62 In his article published the month the New Jersey
District Court decided Iwanowa and Burger-Fischer, Professor Bederman drew
attention to the fact that no ATCA case to date had been dismissed for
152. Id.
153. See id.
154. See 70 F.3d 232, 248-50 (2nd Cir. 1995). For a discussion of the facts and court holding, see
supra, notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
155. See id.
156. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
157. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249. The courts found that the use of the political question doctrine in Tel-Oren
v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 775, did not control the court here and particularly looked on the
"constitutional underpinnings" argument of Judge Bork and Judge Robb with disdain. See Kadic, 70 F.3d
at 249.
158. Id. (quoting Bakerv. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,211 (1962) and Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825,831-32
(2d Cir. 1991)).
159. See Boyd, supra note 4, at 1210-12.
160. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
161. Bederman, supra note 31, at 1474.
162. See id.
nonjusticiability. 63 The justiciability of these cases did not surprise him:
There is no unique or problematic element in a treaty rights case that
would indicate that the executive branch should suggest to a court that it
is deserving of such a fate. Even if the executive branch were to join a
defendant in making such a suggestion in an ATCA case, I do not believe
that a court should defer in such an instance. 164
V. WHERE THE QUERY IS MADE, THE DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY
Applying the Baker factors to the international human rights mass tort cases,
no factor is "inextricable from the case at bar" and therefore mandates a finding
of nonjusticiability based on the political question doctrine.' 65
A. Textually Demonstrable Constitutional Commitment of the Issue to a
Coordinate Political Department
166
The Constitution at no point delegates the determination of whether
international human rights victims have the right to sue for this egregious level of
personal injury to another branch of government, forbidding the judiciary from
touching the issue.167 The Second Circuit in Kadic reasoned that the answer to the
question of which department of the government has the duty to handle the human
rights atrocities is obvious-the judiciary. 168
In the recently dismissed Iwanowa and Burger-Fischercases, the district court
held in both instances that the power over foreign policy matters rests with the
President.169 The Iwanowa court asserted, "[t]he nature of war is such that the
governments of the victorious nations determine and negotiate the resolution of the
claims of their nationals by way of agreements between the nations involved or
affected by the war," relying on treaties as evidence. 70 However, the court failed
to consider that the claims far exceed what is normal in the "nature of war."''
After listing numerous treaties, the court made a conclusory statement that the
claims are necessarily committed to the "political branches" of the government
because the "nature of war" lends itself to agreements between nations, with which
163. See id.
164. Id.
165. See Low & JEFFRIES, supra note 41, at 434.
166. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
167. See CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 14 at 85 (5th ed. 1994).
168. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d. Cir. 1995).
169. See Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248,282-83 (D.N.J. 1999); Iwanowa v. Ford
Motor Co., 57 F. Supp. 2d 424, 485 (D.N.J. 1999).
170. iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 485.
171. See id.
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the judiciary may not interfere.1 2 The court also dropped a footnote in support of
its statement that reparations claims have always been the concern of the executive
branch.' 73 The court noted that slave labor claims, such as those brought by the
Plaintiff class, have always been considered reparations by Germany. 7 4
B. Lack of Judicially Discoverable and Manageable Standards for
Resolving Claims1'75
Rationally, courts with human rights mass torts on their dockets should have
great difficulty justifying dismissing cases as political questions based on the
grounds that no judicially discoverable and manageable standards exist for
resolving the controversy. The very nature of this litigation, as class actions, is
certainly manageable for the same reasons that other mass torts are manageable:
once a class is certified under Rule 23, there is no reason to suspect that it will
then be unmanageable.'76 The requisite elements of certification, numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy ensure that actions will be manageable by
the courts.'77 Furthermore, courts adjudicating mass torts frequently employ other
procedural tools and techniques designed to ease the judicial process of litigating
mass torts, including appointing special masters for the damages phase of trials, 78
using systems of collective recovery to compensate victims, '79 as well as instituting
172. See id.
173. Id. at n.4.
174. Id. The court offers no explanation for why the vague statement, "the concept of reparations claims
encompasses all international law claims for compensation related to war [including] individual claims by
injured citizens of victorious powers," should dictate this country's view of these claims or necessarily
confine all injury within the German contemplation. See id.
175. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
176. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
177. See id. 23(a). These requirements in full:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all
only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are
questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Id. For an excellent discussion of the merits of adjudicating international human rights atrocities through
the class action mechanism see generally Boyd, supra note 4. Professor Boyd details the utility of the class
action as providing a unique forum for plaintiffs unavailable in other domestic courts. Her article articulates
the manner in which a procedural mechanism affects substantive rights, by illustrating through cultural
genocide, Holocaust, and environmental human rights cases the power of the class action to ensure corporate
compliance with human rights norms. See id.
178. See generally Sol Schreiber& Laura D. Weissbach, In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human
Rights Litigation: A Personal Account of the Role of the Special Master, 31 LOY. L. REV. 475 (1998).
179. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 33.2 (3d ed. 1995) (stating that the creations of funds
and schedules of compensation is determined by aggregate procedures).
a fluid recovery system, under which damages are aggregated for purposes of
determining liability." °
Courts have recognized in ATCA cases the utility of the class action. The
Kadic court reasoned, "our decision in Filartiga established that universally
recognized norms of international law provide judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for adjudicating suits brought under the Alien Tort Act,
which obviates any need to make initial policy decisions of the kind normally
reserved for nonjudicial discretion."'' Additionally, the Second Circuit reasoned
that the presence of any judicial standards undermines any claim that the issues
are constitutionally reserved to another branch of the government.' 82 In pending
and future human rights litigation, this analysis should instruct courts on proper
use of the doctrine: Where the court is capable of discerning the standards, it
should interpret that ability as a primary indicator of justiciability." 3
The Iwanowa court viewed Plaintiffs' claims as too demanding on the
judiciary, producing a "daunting task. ' ' "M However, the court failed to enumerate
any concerns which the proposed methods discussed would not easily resolve.'85
The Burger-Fischer court also found that the case was unmanageable, relying
primarily on the confidential nature of some of the evidence the court would need
to examine in order to adjudicate the claims.8 6 This reasoning wholly lacks merit;
should the parties bringing the action not want that "confidential information"
divulged, they should opt out of the class, and information which corporations
against whom liability is sought do not want publicly known is irrelevant. 7
C. The Impossibility of Deciding the Case Without an Initial Policy
Determination of a Kind Clearly for Nonjudicial Discretion'8 8
Regarding the fourth through sixth Baker factors, the Second Circuit relied
on the Supreme Court's admonition in both Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American
Cetacean Society..9 and Baker"9 when reasoning "[d]isputes implicating foreign
policy concerns have the potential to raise political question issues, although, as
the Supreme Court has wisely cautioned, 'it is error to suppose that every case or
180. See 2 NEWBURG ON CLASS ACrIONS §§ 10.16-10.19 (3d. ed. 1995).
181. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d. Cir. 1995).
182. Id.
183. See id.
184. See Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 489 (D.N.J. 1999).
185. See supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text.
186. See Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 283 (D.N.J. 1999).
187. See id.
188. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
189. 478 U.S. 221,229-30 (1986).
190. 369 U.S. at 211.
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controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance. '' 9
In Burger-Fischer, the district court concluded that a policy determination by the
President preceded any decision that the court might make. " However, the court
referred to the policy determination here as the President's treaty negotiation with
foreign powers. 93 One has nothing to do with the other. No party has asked
"whether the President could have extracted a more favorable settlement"; instead,
the Plaintiff class seeks to recover for the slave labor Defendants instituted against
them collectively and individually."9
D. Impossibility of a Court's Undertaking Independent Resolution Without
Expressing Lack of the Respect Due Coordinate Branches of Government95
The Iwanowa court also found this criterion met, reasoning that under the
U.S. position that World War II claims be resolved "through government-to-
government negotiations," slave labor claims brought by individual victims
demonstrated a fundamental disrespect for the political branches of government. "
However, this assessment assumes that the claims arise out of the war itself and
that they are covered by the negotiations governing general war damages.' 97 Both
assumptions are erroneous. 98 The claims brought by the Plaintiff class are beyond
the contemplation of any agreements between the governmental powers and, in
fact, beyond the nature of war. 9
E. Unusual Need for Unquestioning Adherence to a Political Question
Already Made2°°
This interest is not implicated in Iwanowa and Burger-Fischer. It is likely not
in issue generally in human rights mass tort litigation because these cases are the
first to hold that the political question doctrine disqualifies the Holocaust litigation
191. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249-50 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
Japan Whaling Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 229-30).
192. See Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 283 (D.N.J. 1999).
193. See id. at 283 (citations omitted).
194. See id.
195. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
196. Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 486-87 (D.N.J. 1999).
197. See id.
198. See supra notes 170-72.
199. See id.
200. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
from adjudication. 2"'
F. The Potentiality of Embarrassment from Multifarious Pronouncements
by Various Departments on One Question20
2
Iwanowa found this factor implicated, holding that judgment "would
inevitably embarrass and undermine our executive branch's authority in foreign
affairs."2 3 The court offered no explanation for its assessment, but clearly the
claims here were for individual human rights torts against private corporations,
although collectivized, rather than actions against foreign governments for war
reparations.2' Accordingly, this factor has no application in human rights mass
torts.
Analyzing the six Baker factors reveals a paradox that remains unsolved by
the court.2' 5 Application of the political question doctrine demands that one of the
three branches of government ultimately decide the scope of all three branches'
powers.' ° Though the basis for the doctrine supposedly lies in the separation of
powers, the doctrine actually works to strip two of the branches of power while
vesting the ultimate decision of delegation in one branch.2' Clearly, the framers
intended the courts, under the doctrine of judicial review, to be the "ultimate
arbiters of interstitial disputes in the constitutional scheme."2' However, it is
equally clear that, under the political question doctrine, the judiciary is stripped
of any potential decision making power regarding the scope of its powers.' °
VI. CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of the Iwanowa and Burger-Fischer district court decisions,
the political question doctrine rests in a precarious position. With appeal by the
Plaintiff classes around the corner, the applicability of the doctrine to international
human rights cases may soon reach resolution. The ramifications of that decision
will be far reaching, influencing not only the use of the doctrine domestically and
abroad, but international relations as well. Most importantly, it will set the tenor
for the U.S. role in enforcing international human rights law.
201. See Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248,281-85 (D.N.J. 1999); lwanowa, 67 F.
Supp. 2d at 489.
202. Id.
203. Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 487 (D.N.J. 1999).
204. See id. at 487-88.
205. See Bederman, supra note 3 1, at 1445.
206. Id.
207. See id.
208. See id. at 1443.
209. See id. at 1445.
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At some point, it is certain that the Supreme Court will have occasion to hear
this important issue. At that time, should it consider the nature of these claims for
what they are-egregious violations of the basic rights of humanity, rather than
war-time casualties-it will certainly be wary of dismissing accountability for
corporations and corrupt leaders who might hope to hide under the protective
umbrella of the political question doctrine. Instead, courts should shield those
who need it: the victims of international human rights abuses.
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